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Zapata Corporation 
v. Maldonado: 
Assessing a Precedent 
JAN G. DEUTSCH * 
This article examines the Delaware Supreme Court decision 
of Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado and attempts to determine 
whether the opinion is good law. T he author contends that the 
decision will Lead to more Litigation as there is no clear indication 
as to what makes a corporation's business judgment not to pursue 
a court action justifiable. However, only time will tell if it is a 
good precedent. 
Law and the Promise of Stability 
Law is the process we have chosen as a preferred means for the reso-
lution of conflicts. Because our civilization treats the individual human 
as a reality entitled to the same respect as the state, the process of law is 
adversary in nature. Assume the proceedings advance beyond the pro-
cedural steps designed to eliminate cases that cannot effectively be sup-
ported. We are then confronted with a situation in which both parties 
argue from precedent, a situation that represents the paradox of law. 
In a strict common-law system, the law is a set of precedents. As the 
realists taught us, however, what law is, in fact, is simultaneously a set 
of human institutions-a process designed and operated by humans-
and a set of precepts treated as binding obligations: as rules governing 
the activities in which humans engage. What makes this situation para-
doxical is that law is successful as a process for resolving conflicts be-
cause both of the disputing parties feel justified in arguing that the law is 
on their side; yet the fact is that people in the end revere the law becau~e 
what it promises is stability: a stability premised on a logical structure 
whose clear and definite standards are fundamentally incompatible with 
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the potential conflict that permits both parties to the dispute to appeal 
to legal rules. 
What has been described, while puzzling to the layperson, is a 
familiar phenomenon to litigators. What litigation accomplishes is the 
accommodation to the mosaic of the law of a set of facts not agreed 
clearly to be covered by the existing pattern. Similarly, what we mean 
by the development of doctrine is a process that changes the existing 
pattern: a. set of. decis~o~s that either restrict o~ .expand th~ precedents 
contained m earlier opmwns. Yet each of the lltigators, while aware of 
this process, believes his reading of the law to be valid. The question 
becomes, therefore, one of legitimacy, why we feel justified in coercing 
the losing party to abide by the court's decision. It is ultimately this 
feeling of justification that underpins the conclusion that a case is "good" 
Jaw. The question explored in the remainder of this article is whether 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 1 is "good" law. 
Untangling the Judicial Web 
In mid-1974, recognizing that a tender offer the corporation was 
about to make for its shares would cause the market price of those shares 
to rise, Zapata Corporation's directors amended its corporate stock 
option plan to permit options to be exercised prior to the announcement 
of the tender offer. In June 1975, Maldonado brought a derivative action 
in the Delaware Court of Chancery alleging breach of fiduciary duty. 
The claims were that the amendment to the stock option plan avoided 
substantial tax liability for the optionees (including most of the then 
directors) and deprived Zapata of a tax deduction of a comparable 
amount. 
Two years later, the same claims were made by Maldonado in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the 
same defendants (save one), together with claims under Sections 7, 2 
10(b) ,3 and 14(a) 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On the 
1 604 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. G-1 (Del. May 13, 1981) (hereinafter cited 
as Zapata). 
2 The Section 7 claim alleged that the Federal Reserve Board's margin require-
ments were violated when the optionees purchased stock with loans from the 
corporation. The claim was dismissed on the basis that, even if a private cause 
of action could be brought under Section 7, the corporation had suffered no 
damage from the alleged violation. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.24a-9. 
v 
42 THE CORPORATION LAW REVIEW 
basis that it would be futile, no demand that Zapata pursue these claims 
was made on the board of directors in either case. 
Federal Court Background 
District Court Dismisses Suit 
In 1978, the district court dismissed the claims under the securities 
laws, and then, there being no federal claims to which the common-law 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty could be pendent, dismissed those as 
welJ.5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal of the section 10 (b) claim: 
Since Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 
1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977), an essential element is that the 
defendants have engaged in some form of deception [and thus] [e]ven 
if some directors have an interest in the transaction, absent domina-
tion or control of a corporation or of its board by the officer-bene-
ficiaries, approval of the transaction by a disinterested majority of 
the board possessing authority to act and fully informed of all rele-
vant facts will suffice to bar a Rule lOb-5 claim that the corporation 
or its stockholders were deceived. 6 
In Santa Fe, decided in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
where it is not alleged that the transaction is either manipulative or de-
ceptive, a complaint alleging that shareholders were treated unfairly by 
a fiduciary does not state a cause of action under Section 10 (b), which 
deals with manipulation and deception. The complaint dealt with 
appraisal rights under the Delaware merger laws, and the opinion ended 
by acknowledging the possibility that "there may well be a need for uni-
form federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that chal-
lenged in this complaint," 7 but refused to create such standards because, 
"to the extent that R ule 10b-5 is interpreted to require a valid corporate 
purpose for elimination of minority shareholders as well as a fair price 
for their shares, it would impose a stricter standard of fiduciary duty than 
that required by the law of some States." 8 
5 Maldonado v. F lynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y., 1978). 
6 Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979) . 
7 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480-481 (1977 ) . 
BJd. at 480, n. 16. 
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Court of Appeals Finds Federal Cause of Action 
When the Maldonado appeal was argued before the Second Circuit 
late in 1978, "the sttae court action was evidently about to go to trial." 9 
The Second Circuit 'held, nevertheless, in connection with Maldonado's 
claim under Section 14(a) (the statutory basis for rules governing proxy 
solicitations) , that: 
We believe that a reasonable shareholder of Zapata Corporation 
could have considered it important, in deciding how to vote his 
proxy in 1976 and 1977, to know that the candidates for director-
ships had voted for, and in some cases benefited substantially from, 
the resolutions modifying the exercise date and removing the require-
ment of payment in cash so as to enable certain senior officers to 
avoid the adverse personal tax effect of the impending tender offer, ( 
known to them through inside information, while depriving the Cor- 1 
poration of a corresponding tax benefit. 10 
Since that holding meant that the complaint now stated a federal 
cause of action, the district court, on remand in Spring 1979, was directed 
"to determine in its discretion ... whether the common-law claims should 
be left for resolution by the state court." 1 1 Prior to any such determina-
tion, however, Maldonado amended his complaint to delete those claims, 
thus mooting the issue of pendent jurisdiction. 
Independent Directors Recommend Dismissing Suit 
By June 1979, four of the defendant-directors were no longer on the 
board, and the remaining directors appointed two new outside members 
to the board and created an Independent Investigation Committee com-
posed solely of the two new directors to investigate pending litigation and 
determine whether Zapata should continue any of it. Such determination 
was stated to be "final, . . . not . . . subject to review of the Board 
of Directors and . . . in all respects . . . binding upon the Corpora-
tion." In September, the Committee concluded that "continued main-
tenance [of the litigation] is inimical to the Company's best interests," 
and Zapata moved for dismissal or summary judgment in both the state 
and federal actions. 
9 Maldonado v. F lynn, note 6 supra, at 798, n. 14. 
10 ld. 
11 /d. at n. 14. 
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District Court Dismisses Case; Business Judgment Rule 
Properly Exercised 
In January 1980, the district court held that "under the analysis pre-
scribed in Burks, 1 ~ if a committee of independent, personally disin-
terested directors of Zapata has determined in good faith that in its busi-
ness judgment the continuation of this action is not in the best interests 
of that corporation, the action must be dismissed." The reference to 
Burks was directed at Maldonado's argument: 
[T]hat the "business judgment rule" of Delaware is inconsistent with 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and cannot 
be used to foreclose prosecution of his claim thereunder: [an argu-
ment based on] the recently decided case of Burks v. Lasker [in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States] held that a two-step 
inquiry was required: As a threshold question, does applicable 
state law permit independent directors to terminate a derivative action 
against other board members? And, if so, is such a state law rule 
consistent with the policies of the federa l laws upon which the action 
is based.13 
The resulting dismissal was appealed to the Second Circuit. 
State Court Background 
Chancery Court-One Trial for One Claim 
Two months later, however, the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
denied Zapata's motion for dismissal, holding that in the absence of 
judicial scrutiny of allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, Delaware 
law gave to shareholders an individual right to maintain derivative 
actions which they instituted, and that the business judgment rule was 
therefore irrelevant to the question whether Delaware corporations had 
the right to terminate such suits.u 
Shortly thereafter, Zapata filed with the Supreme Court of Delaware 
an interlocutory appeal which was accepted on June 5, 1980. On May 
29, however, the Court of Chancery dismissed Maldonado's cause of 
action on the following grounds: 
12 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
13 Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (footnotes 
omitted). 
u Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
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If the action of the District Court dismissing Maldonado's suit is 
ultimately upheld, an order dismissing the present action, based on res 
judicata, will be entered. If the District Court is reversed, an order 
will be entered denying Zapata's motion to dismiss. 
If the result here seems harsh in view of my March 18, 1 980, ruling 
that Zapata does not have the power under Delaware law to compel 
the dismissal of a stockholder's derivative suit by relying on the busi-
ness judgment rule, it should be remembered that sound public policy 
mandates but one trial for one claim. Maldonado has already once 
argued and lost in the District Court on the issue of whether Zapata's 
Board of Directors may compel the dismissal of his claims. He 
assumed the risk of inconsistent adjudications when he, by his own 
strategy, elected to commence two actions, one here and one in the 
U.S. District Court, and then decided to amend out of his federal 
complaint his pendant common law theory of recovery. Since he 
created this risk it is entirely proper that he bear its burdens.1 5 
Delaware Supreme Court Ends the Procedural Gridlock 
The Second Circuit, however, ordered the appeal to it stayed pending 
action by the Supreme Court of Delaware. Responding to Zapata's 
characterization of the situation as a "procedural gridlock," the Supreme 
Court of Delaware embarked upon a task it described as an "attempt to 
resolve the particular question of Delaware law . . . whether the Com-
mittee has the power to cause the present action to be dismissed." 10 
Given that Maldonado had made no demand on the board, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery that: "The 
'business judgment' rule is a judicial creation that presumes propriety, 
under certain circumstances, in a board's decision [and thus] does not 
create authority [and] [i]n this sense [is] not relevant in corporate deci-
sion making until after a decision is made [by the board]." 1 7 It agreed, 
moreover, that the question to be decided was "the power of [Zapata] 
by motion to terminate a lawsuit properly commenced by a stockholder 
without prior demand." 18 
l5 Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378,384-385 (Del. Ch. 1980) . 
16 See Zapata, note 1 supra, at G-1. 
17 ld. at G-2. 
18[d. 
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It held, however, that "[e]ven though demand was not made in this 
case and the initial decision of whether to litigate was not placed before 
the board ... the board entity remains empowered under [Delaware 
statutory law] to make decisions regarding corporate litigation. The 
problem is one of member disqualification, not the absence of power in 
the board." 10 As a result, the order of the Court of Chancery was 
reversed, and the cause was remanded to permit a determination whether 
the Committee's action "[satisfied] the Court's independent business judg-
ment," and if Zapata failed to meet its burden of justifying the dismissal 
ordered by the Committee, ordering the Court of Chancery "carefully 
[to] consider and weigh how compelling the corporate interest in dis-
missal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit [and] when appropriate 
[to] give special consideration to matters of law and policy in addition to 
the corporation's best interests." 20 
In January 1980, before the Court of Chancery had declared its view 
of Delaware law, the district court held that "the final substantive judg-
ment whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires a bal-
ance of many factors ... and is not a legal but a business judgment." 21 
Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court: 
[R]ecognize[d] that "[t]he final substantive judgment whether a par-
ticular lawsuit should be maintained requires a balance of many 
factors-ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, em-
ployee relations, fiscal as well as legal." [citing the District Court]. 
But we are content that such factors are not "beyond the judicial 
reach" of the Court of Chancery which regularly and competently 
deals with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property, 
approval of settlements and scores of similar problems. 22 
In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that its require-
ment that a court "apply . . . its own independent business judgment 
[in determining] whether the motion [of dismissal or summary judgment] 
should be granted, shares some of the same spirit and philosophy of the 
statement by the Vice Chancellor [in the Court of Chancery]: 'Under 
our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the merits of 
1o Id. at G-4. 
2o Id. at G-6. 
21 Maldonado v. Flynn, note 13 supra, 285. 
22 See Zapata, note 1 supra, at G-5. 
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litigation. ' " ~~ It remains true, however, that, whatever the "reach" of 
the Court of Chancery, Maldonado may, at this point, either settle or 
terminate his derivative suit. Depending on action taken by the Second 
Circuit, moreover, it is possible that, even if Maldonado pursues his 
claim, the Court of Chancery may treat its prior decision on res judicata 
as a final determination. 
A Corporation Must Justify Its Business Decision 
The Delaware Supreme Court was quite clear both about the propo-
sitions of law presented by the case it was adjudicating-"a stockholder 
assertion that a derivative suit, properly instituted, should continue for 
the benefit of the corporation and a corporate assertion, properly made 
by a board committee acting with board authority, that the same deriva-
tive suit should be dismissed as inimical to the best interests of the cor-
poration" 24-and about the social policies that provided the rationale 
for the precedents supporting each of the propositions: 
If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest bona fide 
derivative actions away from well-meaning derivative plaintiffs 
through the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit will 
lose much, if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as an 
intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors. . . . If, on 
the other hand, corporations are unable to rid themselves of meritless 
or harmful litigation and strike suits, the derivative action, created 
to benefit the corporation, will produce the opposite, unintended 
result. 25 
A Question of Law 
It was also aware that placing the burden on the corporation to 
justify the committee's business decision transformed that decision into 
a question of law. 
In justifying its holding that Zapata "should have the burden of 
proving independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation," the 
Supreme Court noted that "our approach here is analogous to and con-
sistent with the Delaware approach to 'interested director' transactions, 
23 Id. at G-6, n. 18. 
24 ld. at G-4. 
2~ I d. at G-4. 
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where the directors, once the transaction is attacked, have the burden of 
e~tablishi~g its "intrinsic fairness' to a court's careful scrutiny." 26 It 
J cited Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp ., 27 a precedent familiar to any 
lawyer who has attempted to understand Delaware's response to the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe. 
Sterling was decided in 1952. Singer v. Magnavox Co./8 the first 
decision after Santa Fe in which the Delaware Supreme Court dealt with 
fiduciary obligations imposed by the Delaware law governing corporate 
mergers, held that use of a controlling shareholder position through the 
merger process for no purpose other than to eliminate the minority in-
terests for cash, regardless of the amount paid therefore, is a violation 
of the fiduciary duty owed by a majority shareholder to the minority. 
In Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 29 however, the same 
court held that a cash-out merger is permissible if the purpose is to fur-
~her the interests of the majority shareholder, provided that the purpose 
IS not merely a subterfuge to enable the majority shareholder to rid itself 
of the unwanted minority. 
In 1981, the Court of Chancery reconciled those decisions by noting 
that, in Singer, "proof of a purpose other than . . . minority freeze out 
does not end the matter and there still must be a hearing under the stan-
dard of Sterling," whereas, under Tanzer, "even if the purpose is bona 
fide, there still must be a hearing under the standard of Sterling, and at 
such a hearing it is not sufficient to limit the issue to price alone. Rather, 
price must be considered along with any other relevant factors." 110 
T he citation of Sterling, however, while it may serve to reconcile the 
Singer and Tanzer precedents, provides no guidance on the question 
whether or not a given transaction meets the fiduciary obligations 
imposed by Delaware law. Thus, Justice McNeilly concurred in Singer 
because while he "agree[d] with the holding . . . that a ... merger, 
made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an 
abuse of the corporate process [he was] inclined to think . . . that the 
[Duffy] opinion waffles in its attempt to establish gu idel ines for future 
merger litigation with emphasis on the coined phrase 'business purpose,' 
which standing alone connotes nothing magic or definitive ." 
20 /d. at G-5, n. 17. 
27 93 A.2d 197 (Del. 1952). 
28 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). 
29 379A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). 
30 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1344 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
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That J ustice Duffy (who wrote both Singer and Tanzer) regarded 
McNeilly's criticism as telling accounts for the fact that Singer, although 
handed down before Tanzer, appears in a later volume of the Reporter.=~ 1 
In Singer, moreover, it was Justice McNeilly in concurrence, and not 
Justice Duffy, who held that "in these cases of going private, be they 
mergers under §25 1 or §253, it is my opinion that Sterling v. May-
flower, 93 A.2d 107 (1952) , establishes an avenue for judicial scrutiny 
with a firm foundation based upon factual determinations of fundamental 
fairness and economic reasonableness which should be our guideline for 
future cases." 32 
Setting the Framework for Further Litigation 
Sterling, in other words, though it clearly is the law, is unclear as to 
what the law is. Similarly, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, while it is 
clear that, under certain circumstances, the issue of business judgment 
is a question of law, it is unclear what makes a corporate motion to dis-
miss justifiable, just as it is unclear under Sterling what makes a majority 
shareholder's business purpose bona fide . The one thing that is clear is 
that more litigation will be forthcoming. 
Does the Self-Interest of the Majority of the 
Directors Taint an Independent Committee? 
Legal Standard Applicable to Directors 
Similarly uncertain in terms of its impact on derivative litigation is 
the meaning of the legal standard held by the Supreme Court of Delaware 
to be applicable to corporate directors. What the supreme court holds 
is that "we do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is 
per se a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to an indepen-
dent committee composed of disinterested board members." 33 The con-
clusion of the Court of Chancery's opinion refusing to dismiss the 
complaint, however, makes clear its acceptance of the legal proposition 
announced by the supreme court: 
This decision, of course, is limited to the issue of whether a Board 
of Directors or its Committee may compel the dismissal of a deriva-
a1 Only the first part of the slip opinion quotation explaining Justice McNei lly's 
basis for concurring appears at 380 A.2d 969, 982 (Del. 1977). 
3~ /d. 
33 See Zapata , note 1 supra, at G-4. 
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tive suit without a judicial scrutiny of the allegations of breach of 
fiduciary duty set forth in the Complaint. It has not been necessary 
to consider whether the directors of Zapata acted improperly in 197 4, 
or are entitled to any of the protections offered by the business judg-
ment rule; nor has it been necessary to consider the issue of the 
burden of proof as to the independence of the Committee. Even, 
however, if the business judgment rule were relevant to the dismissal 
issue decided here, it would seem that, under current concepts of fair-
ness and fiduciary duty, directors who are made defendants in a 
stockholder's derivative suit, because they approved a transaction in 
which they had a self-interest, and who then seek a dismissal of the 
suit by appointing an Independent Committee to decide whether the 
suit should continue, should, at least, bear the burden of showing the 
independence of their Committee. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., Del. 
Supr., 3 80 A.2d 969 (1977). a-l 
The disagreement between the two courts centers on the question of 
the impact on the business judgment rule of the directors' interest in the 
transaction the litigation was brought to challenge-and in particular on 
how the substantive legal propositions embodied either in the phrase 
"business judgment" or the word "interest" are to be given effect in legal 
proceedings. A confusion analogous to that produced by the two Dela-
ware opinions was made part of our Jaw by the opinion in Globe Woolen 
Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co.,a5 which held that when the vote on a 
contract between two corporations was taken, the presence of a director 
who held that position in both corporations was sufficient to make the 
contract voidable. 
The Globe Woolen Precedent 
What Globe Woolen involved was a suit by plaintiff corporation to 
compel specific performance of contracts to supply electric current to its 
mills. The facts, as stated in the opinion, are: 
Greenidge . . . superintendent and later the general manager of 
the defendant's electrical department, suggested to Mr. Maynard 
[who was the director of both plaintiff and defendant corporations] 
3 4 Maldonado v. F lynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
35 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (19 18) . 
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the substitution of electric power . . . Maynard was fearful that 
the cost . . . would be too great unless the defendant would guaran-
tee a saving. [F]rom time to time the subject was taken up anew [and 
after] investigation[s] by Greenidge . . . a contract was closed [in] 
the form of letters exchanged between Greenidge and Maynard.36 
What had happened was that "Greenidge had miscalculated the 
amount of steam that would be required to heat the dye houses [because] 
changes in the output of the mills had not been foreseen by Greenidge, 
and Maynard had not warned of them." 37 
The question posed by the Globe Woolen decision is why Maynard 
was held responsible for having failed to warn Greenidge about possible 
future developments, despite the facts that '"plaintiff's books were thrown 
open to Greenidge" 38 and that "[Maynard] may have trusted to the 
superior technical skill of Mr. Greenidge." :!9 The answer consists of 
propositions of law phrased in terms of general rules: "A beneficiary, \ 
about to p~unge into a ruinous course of dealing, may be betrayed by 
silence as well as by the spoken word. T he trustee is free to stand aloof, I 
while others act, if all is equitable and fair. He cannot rid himself of the \ 
duty to warn and to denounce, if there is improvidence or oppression, 
either apparent on the surface, or lurking beneath the surface, but visible ' 
to his practiced eye," 40 and "a finding that there was [a relation of trust 
reposed, of influence exerted, of superior knowledge on the one side and 
legitimate dependence on the other] has evidence to sustain it. A trustee 
may not cling to contracts thus won, unless their terms are fair and 
just. " 41 The conclusion is that "the contracts before us do not survive 
these tests. The unfairness is startling, and the consequences have been 
disastrous." 42 
The difficulty with this precedent is the lack of clarity as to what I 
made the contract voidable : that Maynard was Greenidge's superior in 
1 
terms of the corporate hierarchy, that "as a result of [defendant's con-
tractual guarantee], it has supplied the plaintiff with electric current for I 
nothing, and owes, if the contract stands, about $11 ,000 for the privi-
1 
36Jd. at 486, 121 N.E. at 378-379. 
37 /d. at 488, 121 N.E. at 379. 
38 /d. at 486, 121 N.E. at 380. 
3 9/d. at491 , 121 N.E. at 380. 
4o /d. at 489, 121 N.E. at 380. 
41 /d. at 490, 121 N.E. at 380. 
42/d. at 491, 121 N.E. at 380. 
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lege," ~3 or that Maynard was a director of both corporations. The one 
thing that is clear is the opinion's holding that the legal consequence of 
invalidity flows from the fact that the director could be said to have 
an interest in the transaction on which the vote was being taken rather 
than from the vote itself: 
The plaintiff does not deny that [the contracts would be voidable] if 
the dual director had voted for their adoption. But the argument is 
that by refusing to vote he shifted the responsibility to his asso-
ciates, and may reap a profit from their errors. One does not divest 
oneself so readily of one's duties as trustee. The refusal to vote has, 
indeed, this importance: It gives to the transaction the form and 
presumption of propriety, and requires one who would invalidate it 
to probe beneath the surface. . . . But "the great rule of law" . . . 
which holds a trustee to the duty of constant and unqualified fidelity 
is not a thing of forms and phrases.44 
It is, of course, true, as Globe Woolen notes, that "a dominating in-
fluence can be exerted in other ways than by a vote," 45 but the relevant 
question-whether the dominating influence has in fact been exerted 
and the vote thereby rendered void-is today answered solely by analyz-
ing whether the contract or transaction in question is covered by the state 
statute governing interested directors. T hus, in answering the question 
whether a "board, tainted by the self-interest of a majority of its mem-
bers, can legally delegate its authority to a committee of two disinterested 
directors," it was "by analogy to our statutory section on interested di-
rectors" that the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that it "seems clear 
that the Delaware statute is designed to permit disinterested directors to 
act for the board." 46 
Moving From Common Law to Statutory Law 
The shift from common law to statute that defines the difference 
between Globe and Zapata does not necessarily mean that the juCliciary 
has surrendered authority, so long as it is a court that determines whether 
43 ld. 
H fd. at488, 121 N.E. at 379. 
45 /d. 
<~G See Zapata, note 1 supra, at G-4. 
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or not the statute applies to the contract or transaction being challenged. 
What it does suggest, however, is that the lack of clarity concerning the 
applicability of the standard promulgated by Globe may have contributed 
to the development of statutory standards. Since there is no a priori basis 
which justifies treating statutory law as inferior to common law, Globe 
Woolen remains a "good" precedent even if the law it made was pro-
duced by legislatures rather than judges. The question raised by that 
decision, however, is whether "good" precedent is necessarily unclear, 
and, if so, what it was in the conflict resolved by Globe Woolen that the 
opinion in that case left unclear. 
Two judges in the appellate division, whose decision was being re-
viewed in Globe Woolen, had found "that the contracts were made in 
good faith and that the fact that Maynard was a director in the de-
fendant company did not influence them or have anything to do with 
their making or affect their validity; that the contracts, however, resulted 
solely from a mutual mistake of fact, and the defendant should [there-
fore] be allowed to rescind. . . . " 47 The doctrine of mutual mistake of 
fact was established in Sherwood v. Walker (Rose II of Abalone),48 
which involved a contract for sale of a cow at a price calculated in terms 
of pounds of beef. The seller attempted to repudiate when, before 
delivery to the buyer, it was learned that the cow was with calf. The 
value of a cow as a breeder far exceeds her value as beef. The trial judge 
nevertheless ruled that a mistake about the possibility of pregnancy did 
not constitute grounds for avoiding the contract, holding that whether 
or not a cow was barren was not material to the contract. 
The trial judge's ruling was reversed. What the appellate court 
held was that the mistake was not about the value of the cow but about 
the "substance of the thing bargained for." That the decision in Sher-
wood contemplates the possibility of a mutual mistake as to value (and 
therefore does not rule on the question whether such a mistake would be 
sufficient to void the contract) is indicated by the fact that it lists price 
as one of the material factors in a contract about which a mistake could 
occur. The question raised by Sherwood, therefore, is the meaning of the 
holding that a mistake as to the possibility that a cow is barren is suffi-
cient to make a contract for its sale voidable. 
That the mistake in Sherwood was, in fact, mutual is apparent on the 
47 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 170 App. Div. 940, 941, 254 
N.Y.S. 11 23, 1124, (1915). 
48 66 Mich. 568,33 N.W. 919 (1887). 
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face of the opinion. As the majority views the facts, "it appears from 
the record that both parties supposed this cow was barren and would 
not breed." 49 And while the buyer's knowledge of the cow's condition 
was based on what the seller told him, it is nevertheless true, as the dissent 
notes, that the buyer "believed the cow was farrow; but still that she 
could be made to breed." 50 Since what "farrow" means is barren for 
the season, and since much of the law spawned by the Rule arrainst Per·-petui~ies is based on t?e understanding that one can never bbe wholly 
certam about the duratiOn of a barren condition, it is clear that the mis-
take in Sherwood could in fact be treated as mutual, in that the two 
parties based their beliefs on the same facts and would have agreed, in 
the abstract, on the general rules in terms of which inferences could be 
draw? from those facts concerning the subject of the contract they were 
entenng. 
La.ngu~ge, while o~ten am~ig~ous, does not~ however, permit many 
such sttuatwns to occur, and It IS therefore not surprising that almost 
none of the cases citing Sherwood in fact deals with a mistake that is 
mutual. Sherwood, in short, while "revered by teachers of contract 
law," 51 is not in operational terms an effective precedent. And it is 
presumably for this reason that Cardozo did not analyze Globe Woolen 
as a case of mutual mistake. The fact remains, however, that Sherwood 
had ~een decided, th~t two appellate division judges had regarded the 
doctnne of mutual mistake of fact as dispositive, and that, at the time 
GL?be Woolen was written by Cardozo, electricity was a sufficiently revo-
lutiOnary technological innovation to make the economics involved in its 
use the subject of a mutual mistake. 
The Role of Precedents 
T he ~arad~x of law can perhaps best be expressed by focusing on 
the way m whrch precedent functions . Thus, while the proposition of 
1~~ promulga~e~ in _a ju~icial opinion is itself based on facts, that pnopo-
Sitlon--once ~t IS cited I~ .a later opinion as precedent-itself operates 
as a fact, a given propositiOn beyond human power to change. In this 
sense, a precedent functions as fact because it is a statement about the 
49 I d., 33 N.W. at 923. 
50 /d., 33 N.W. at 924. 
51 H. Kook & Co. v. Scheinmann Hochstein & Trotta Inc. 414 F.2d 93 98 
(2d Cir. 1969). ' ' ' 
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past, and it is the paradox of law that the function of precedent is to 
guide human behavior in the future. 
What makes law so paradigmatic a human institution, moreover, is 
that this paradox is mirrored in the function served by the words used to 
describe the controversy being resolved by the court. Words are used 
to designate feelings causing the behavior that results in litigation, and 
words constitute the best means humans possess for communicating to 
each other information about such feelings. Because I use the same 
word to describe both my feeling and yours, however, does not mean 
that the two emotional states are identical; yet it is only our insistence 
that the same word describing the same thing should have the same con-
sequence that makes a decision adjudicating my behavior applicable to 
the same act committed by someone else, that in the end justifies coercion 
in the name of the law. 
The Unanswered Question 
The question left to the future, then-whether Zapata is a good 
precedent- is the question whether the uncertainty inherent in that de-
cision will prove as fruitful as the ambiguities inherent in the law made 
by Globe Woolen and Sherwood. 
NEPOTISM 
Bill Cosby: "lf at first you do succeed- it's probably your father's 
business." 
- Joey Adams' "Strictly For Laughs" 
The New York Post 
June 18, 1981 
